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The Worth and Peril of Modernity
In this article, I undertake several lines of enquiry in the history of ideo-
logical and political movements centered on the “modernity” polemic at 
the transnational level. By analyzing these movements in juxtaposition, I 
explore the possibility of more diverse narratives of modernity and anti-
modernity than are assumed by conventional dichotomies in contempora-
ry academic writings. The results of my enquiry challenge several pervasive 
“dogmas” of post-colonial theory: that orientalism is a purely modernist in-
tellectual project, while anti-orientalism is by necessity its more “local” dis-
cursive counterpart in a dualism of East and West. My principle evidence 
rests upon analysis of Ahmad Fardid’s thought, a complex and contradic-
tory ideology, philosophically embodying both orientalist and Western at 
the same time as anti-orientalist and traditional ideas. In this connection, 
the article explores the idea of Gharbzadegi (Westoxification), in writings 
of Fardid, Al-e Ahmad, and Shari’ati. These individuals share an important 
elective affinity, while each articulating a distinct vision and alternative 
meaning for the politically influential Gharbzadegi concept. This analysis 
reveals a multi-centered and transnational intellectual space, which can be 
reduced neither to East nor West in a simple geographic dichotomy.
I have always had conflicting personal views in my reflections upon 
what once was called the modern West, but today is usually labelled “mo-
dernity.” I have long harbored an overall feeling of resentment toward the 
West’s uncompromising power, the abstract quality of its social vision, and 
its “universal” self-portrayal as the unique option for the future. Yet, I have 
also found the modern social project seductive, in providing a narrative 
on human agency and “cosmopolitan” ethical imaginary.2  To borrow from 
1    This paper was presented at the Conference “Critique of Modernity,” organized by the 
Centre for Advanced Studies on “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Mo-
dernities” at Leipzig University, June 14–15, 2018.
2 John Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1991).
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John Dewey, it has the promise of a “common faith” for the human com-
munity. Modern societies, to a large extent, have opened a road which may 
lead to a better life, with reduced material suffering for ordinary people. Yet 
I understand modernity as a hazardous path to certain human existential 
desires and needs. This conflicted picture describes the new cosmopolita-
nism of the modern West. The risk here, for a person of my background, 
is to be excluded, where cosmopolitanism is imagined within the vista of 
“Westoxification” rather than a “common ethical humanism.”
This tentative view of modernity, in my mind, often vacillates between 
hope and bitterness. There is hope: I am often inspired by modernist lite-
rature and the arts, democratic social movements, and post-metaphysical 
thought (modern science and rational thought). There is bitterness in the 
dark experiences of modern colonialism, state violence, and the arrogance 
of the modern Western view of the wider world. You may rightly conclude 
that I am undecided, or, less generously, confused and mistaken about the 
worth of modernity and its possibilities. I would prefer a more humble and 
modest modernity, but this does not come naturally for a world history 
making enterprise on this scale. 
For these reasons, I am not a highly enthusiastic modernist scholar. I 
have always worried about modernity’s excessive intrusion into our lived 
experience, and the means/end dichotomy underlying the intrusion. How-
ever, I am by far more terrified of the anti-modernist political wave. Its 
heroic emotional power, both nostalgic and prophetic, can mobilize the 
anxious minds and restless bodies of modern populations, in pursuit of the 
impossible dream of a perfect heaven on earth or hereafter. Whereas mo-
dernity is very utopian in its abstract promise, it is objectively constrained 
by the material reality available to us. Anti-modernity, however, is reckless-
ly fierce in its “calling,” as it refuses to recognize the materiality of our life 
experience. There are no “outside” constraints. Its extreme “culturalism,” a 
boundless wave of imaginative language, can capture intellectual and lay 
psyches equally, and drive us all headlong to its tragically destructive end.
I am envious of my late friend and brilliant scholar of the modern ex-
perience, Marshal Berman, who could speak or write passionately, with 
fantastic enthusiasm and clarity, about modern possibilities and achieve-
ments. I am far less nostalgic, and much more troubled by how incomplete, 
to borrow from Jürgen Habermas, “the project of modernity” is. Those in-
tellectuals and thinkers whom I admire seem to share my hesitation in fully 
embracing modernity. Dewey, for example, was concerned with the “spi-
ritual” fragility of democratic politics and invited us to embrace a “com-
mon faith.” This idea crosses the boundaries of the secular and religious, 
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while remaining embedded in human labor, and our ability to create and 
remember to reinvigorate modern and democratic sensibilities. Dewey be-
lieved that the “religious” could be liberated from organized “religion,” as 
the resource of human creativity and intelligence. He also suggested that 
problem-solving could form a new, cosmopolitan and pluralistic basis for 
belonging.
Marshal Berman was a genuine product of the Western modernity of 
the 1960s. The modernity I personally experienced, by contrast, was iro-
nically self-negating. It offered me university education at the Faculty of 
Law, Tehran University. However, it also kept me in the prison house of the 
academy. There was little to no space for critical learning, debate, and free 
thinking or action.  As an intellectual space, it was deeply anti-intellectual. 
In short, my experience in the 1970s at Tehran University was depressingly 
different to Marshal Berman’s lived experience at Columbia University in 
the 1960s. He was protesting a mistaken modernity, but, I was working 
hard to liberate myself from its brutal hands.
It might seem, therefore, natural to expect me to join the anti-modernist, 
or, say, post-modernist, academic current. Instead, I have been thinking 
and writing about the anti-modern intellectual trends in Iran for the past 
25 years. I have felt, and been reminded by my colleagues, that my work is 
not very relevant to our time and academic life today. “No one really does 
these kinds of works anymore, except for Jeffry Herf3,” one academic friend 
told me in the 1990s. I have continued my work regardless of the pressure 
by the academic guardians of the current orthodoxy, as I increasingly find 
my work of more relevance to our life outside of the university.
Of course, while I may admire and share the views of certain scholars in 
post-colonial or post-modernism, others trouble me deeply. I am above all 
worried about the anti-intellectualism that some among the post-colonial 
scholars regularly advocate. A kind of “academic tribalism” prevails today, 
which has led to the imposition of an orthodoxy, which we are all expec-
ted to conform to. The idea that, for example, “one will not read orienta-
list scholars,” or, take any modernist works seriously, seem very troubling. 
Even more disturbing is to think of certain scholarly works as “academic 
taboo,” in an emerging new conformism which forces us to unquestionably 




3   Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism (London: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
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A recent book on Michel Foucault’s writings about the Iranian revoluti-
on provides a good example of academic tribalism, in the anti-intellec-
tual and dogmatic current. This book, Foucault in Iran: Islamic Revolu-
tion After the Enlightenment,4 is an extension of an earlier work by the 
same author, simply sub-titled “In Defense of Foucault on the Iranian 
Revolution.”5 It is one among assorted published pieces by the great many 
Foucault admirers defending the philosopher’s very romantic exposé of 
the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Almost none of these ‘scholars’ know 
much about Iranian history, politics, or culture, and most are familiar 
only with secondary sources on the Iranian Revolution. However, they 
seem to feel a “moral” obligation to criticize those who have questioned 
Foucault, and a personal commitment to defend his legacy impetuously.
Foucault had only crude knowledge of the subject of his writings. He 
intentionally refused to even talk to secular (liberal or leftist) intellectuals 
and activists during his two trips to Iran. He praised Ayatollah Khomeini 
while suggesting that the “Islamic State” might prove a viable alternative 
to liberal democracy.6 None of these facts bother any of Foucault’s ad-
mirers, who insist that the anti-modernist optic is the only meaningful 
mode of political judgment.7 I find Foucault to be a brilliant scholar in 
many ways. While I appreciate some of his works on the interrelated na-
ture of “power” and “truth claim making,” his writings on the Iranian 
Revolution were an eye-opening revelation for me. How can so great a 
thinker write these very flawed pieces, while never critically reflecting on 
4    Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi, Foucault in Iran: Islamic Revolution After the Enlightenment 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016).
5     Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi, “When Life Will No Longer Barter Itself: In Defense of Fo-
cault on the Iranian Revolution,” in A Foucault for the 21st Century: Governmentality, 
Biopolitics and Discipline in the New Millennium. Ed. Sam Binkley and Jorge Capetillo 
(Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009).
6 Maxime Rodinson wrote a critical piece about Foucault’s writings and pointed out 
that: “Foucault felt embarrassed to speak of Islamic government as an ‘idea’ or even an 
‘ideal.’ But the slogan of an Islamic government seemed to express a ‘political will’ that 
impressed him. According to him, it concerned, on the one hand, an effort to give the 
traditional structures of Islamic society (as they appeared in Iran) a permanent role in 
political life” (Maxime Rodinson, “Khomeini and the ‘Primacy of the Spiritual’,” Le 
Nouvel Observateur February 19 (1979)).
7 Maxime Rodinson further wrote: “A very great thinker, Michel Foucault, part of a line 
of radically dissident thought, placed excessive hopes in the Iranian Revolution. The 
great gaps in his knowledge of Islamic history enabled him to transfigure the events 
in Iran, to accept for the most part the semi-theoretical suggestions of his Iranian 
friends, and to extrapolate from this by imagining an end of history that would make 
up for disappointments in Europe and elsewhere” (Rodinson, “Khomeini and the ‘Pri-
macy of the Spiritual’ ”).
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them, and then remain obstinate even when it later becomes clear how 
wrong he had been? More curiously, what makes so many well-known 
scholars, who admire him, persist in defending him and, in a sense, re-
affirming his flawed writings? This type of scholarly practice is the very 
symptom of unreflective orthodoxy.
The indifference to ‘Foucault’s arguments’ compelled me to reflect 
more deeply on Foucault’s articulation of power/knowledge. The idea that 
power shapes our understanding of “truth” can appear a reasonable in-
terpretation and a productive sociological concept. Institutions and pro-
cesses of knowledge production do not operate in a vacuum, or outside of 
power relationships. However, a rather careless understanding of know-
ledge/power – perhaps misunderstanding – can lead us to a narrowly 
ideological view of the knowledge-truth relation. All ideas are imagined 
as reducible to certain political positions. Identity becomes prioritized 
over objectivity. This can dangerously lead to a sweeping disregard for 
empirical evidence, historical information, and even the desire for scho-
larly “objectivity” and fairness. What remains, subsequently, is “the war” 
of “truth making,” and the policing of ideas, concepts and theories as a 
moral act. A war of intellectual “tribes,” instead of the desire for clear con-
ceptualization of reality, leaves nothing but an academic culture of group 
affiliations. Truth and knowledge is no longer about our ‘scholarly’ efforts 
and labor to know. Instead, it becomes a product of the ‘scholar’s’ identity. 
This is precisely what frightens me about anti-modernity in scholarship.
* * *
Transnationalism in Iranian Political Thought8, a study of Iranian anti-
modernism, profiles the philosophy of Ahmad Fardid (1910–1994). 
Fardid was an Iranian philosopher who coined the idea of Gharbzadegi 
(Westoxification). He was perhaps the founding father of anti-orientalism 
and post-colonial theory in Iran and beyond. Fardid was a profoundly 
conservative man, who waged a radical intellectual assault on modern 
Iranian ideas and experiences. He advocated an elusive notion of “spiri-
tual politics,” along the same lines as Henri Corbin earlier and Michel 
Foucault later. After the Islamic Revolution of 1978, Fardid proclaimed 
8 Ali Mirsepassi, Transnationalism in Iranian Political Thought: The Life and Times of Ah-
mad Fardid (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
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himself the philosopher of the Islamic Revolution. Fardid keenly suppor-
ted the most conservative faction among the Iranian Islamists.
In the 1960s and 70s, Fardid was at the center of attention for some 
of the most influential Iranian philosophers, scholars and intellectuals. 
These included Dariush Shayegan, Hamid Enayat, Shahroukh Meskoub, 
Abdul Hassan Jalili, Reza Davari, and many others. Such important Ira-
nian intellectuals as Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Dariush Ashuri, and Ehsan Nara-
ghi were influenced by him, and they spread his ideas to the public in 
popularized form.
In my view, Fardid, despite many failings (inability to articula-
te coherent arguments, and personal flaws), was a pioneer thinker in 
the anti-orientalist and post-colonial tradition. He was a great Iranian 
anti-modernist. In this sense, Fardid was true to his own philosophical 
beliefs during his long life. These included the idea of Eastern Spirituality 
(Ma’naviyat-e Sharghi ) and Erfan, as well as the philosophical embrace 
of his German interlocutor, Martin Heidegger. Fardid was a true anti-
modernist at a formative historical period in modern Iran.
I would like to use my study of Fardid to discuss some theoretical 
ideas for our reflection, and some key beliefs underpinning post-colonial 
theory.
Gharbzadegi discourse critiques modern and Western ideas as se-
cular and colonial in Iran and the non-West. I would like to argue that 
the Gharbzadegi idea is the complex site of a transnational circulation of 
ideas, producing a significant discursive formation in the Iranian political 
imagination. Briefly, two thinkers, Ahmad Fardid and Henri Corbin, are 
discussed to make my points:
The young Fardid was influenced by the fin de siècle French critique 
of modern Western rationality, pioneered by Henri Bergson. He was also 
inspired by the notion of Spiritual Islam, pronounced by Henry Corbin. 
These ideas helped Fardid with a platform offering a new interpretation 
of Islamic and Iranian traditions. At this juncture, Fardid’s thoughts were 
closely related to European counter-Enlightenment ideology. Fardid sub-
sequently spent eight years in post-World War II France and Germany 
(1947–1955), where he derived inspiration from the Heideggerian critique 
of Western modernity.9
At the Sorbonne, Fardid studied under Maurice de Gandillac (1906–
2006), a professor of medieval philosophy. De Gandillac was deeply in-
9 Fardid mentioned Heidegger and German phenomenology in some of his writings before he 
left for Europe. It seems he was introduced to Heidegger via reading French early in his life.
11
spired by Nietzschean thought. His major book, Geneses of Modernity, 
has strong Heideggerian influence. De Gandillac argued that there are at 
least two sources for the development of modernity. One is the practice 
of excluding “others”, or the idea of progress. The non-moderns, within 
the ideal of progress, are the “damned”. The second source is the thirst 
for knowledge, the defining identity of those modern “progressives” who 
are saved. He also suggested that in modern subjectivity, the category of 
knowledge has replaced God (for Fardid, carnal soul, or nafs-e ammareh). 
Modernity is therefore divided, as in a split personality, between “ratio-
nality” and “subjectivity.”10
Within this context, Fardid coined the Persian term Gharbzadegi 
(Westoxification), as a “localized” Heideggerian anti-modernist idea. He  ex- 
plained his intellectual transformation while living in Germany: Every-
one knows that I coined the concept of “Gharbzadegi.” I was
inspired while I was in solitude somewhere in Europe [Hei-
delberg, Germany]. I am not suggesting that I am superior to 
Jalal Al-e Ahmad, nor vice versa. My knowledge, however, is 
more [than Al-e Ahmad’s]. His way of thinking is different. 
My lifestyle and my studies are different. From that time [that 
I offered the concept of Gharbzadegi] to now, I have always 
been on the [same] “path.” I don’t claim that, since I have of-
fered the idea of Gharbzadegi, I have achieved a total revolu-
tion in my mind. But a kind of revolution has transpired in 
my thinking.11
Simultaneously, Corbin, also inspired by Heidegger and the Iranian phi-
losopher, Suhrawardi (1155–1191), presented a new understanding of Is-
10  De Gandillac’s 600-page book traces “the intellectual and spiritual sources of Europe.” 
Covering twelve centuries, it traces the duality of metaphysical and mystical paradigms of 
nature, and projects a “politics of sainthood.” A densely erudite work, locating prophetic 
premonitions in historical figures and ideas, i.e. Gnosticism, its millennial concluding 
chapter envisions the “birth of a new world” (Maurice de Gandillac, Genèses de la moder-
nité: Les douze siècles où se fit notre Europe; de “La cité de Dieu” à “La nouvelle Atlantide” 
(Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1992)). De Gandillac’s interest extended beyond mysticism, to 
politics. He was a proto-fascist, participating in the Action Française party, promoting a 
royalist, Catholic state, and preaching an anti-Semitic doctrine. This party, born of Drey-
fus Affair, foreshadowed the occupation era Vichy regime, and its chief members joined 
the collaborationist government. Even though a conservative thinker, de Gandillac was a 
mentor for important post-structuralists during their student days, including Foucault, 
Derrida, and Deleuze.
11 Ahmad Fardid, Gharb va Gharbzadegi, Vol. 1 (unpublished, Tehran: Iran Research Insti-
tute for Philosophy), 18–19.
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lam in Iran as a spiritual tradition. This was based on his interpretation 
of Shi’a Islam. Soon, Corbin’s ideas became influential within the Iranian 
intellectual scene.
We therefore see a seminal two-way migration of intellectual ideas 
into national politics, involving Islamic tradition and Heideggerian 
thought, and French orientalism. The motley cocktail spread from war-
ravaged Europe to politically volatile Iran, followed by Iranian Sufi ideas 
streaming back into Europe, then returning, in newly regenerated form, 
to their Iranian homeland.
The orientalist Corbin exemplified this amazing concoction: he is 
known as a French scholar of Persian and Islamic tradition, but, he was 
also a deeply Heideggerian philosopher who introduced Heidegger’s 
works to French readers. Corbin spent almost half a century surrounding 
himself with a self-created institution of students and devotees. Editing 
and translating Iranian and Islamic texts, Corbin established an idio-
syncratic interpretation of Iranian Islam that he labelled Spiritual Islam. 
Corbin also belonged to the larger Christian anti-modernist current that 
grew out of the Cold War era.12
Who was Corbin precisely: An orientalist? A Christian anti-moder-
nist? A lover of Islamic mysticism? A Heideggerian? One can pose nearly 
identical questions for Fardid. These were scholars who crossed intellec-
tual borders, and who are best described as transnational thinkers. While 
exhibiting certain qualities of the classic orientalists, they also sharply 
differed from the orientalist model documented by Edward Said. Unlike 
Said’s evocation, they were neither exclusively modernist nor sympathetic 
to colonial or imperialist desires. On the contrary. Non-Western religious 
traditions deeply inspired them, and they were radically hostile to the 
modern West in its secular, imperial, and democratic dimensions.
We need to think through the theoretical implications of these two ex-
amples, for they imply something far-reaching about the limits and blind 
spots of contemporary scholarship.
Let’s explain some of these ideas and try to flesh out how they are 
often related: Ideas, including the apparently “local,” “authentic,” “tradi-
tional,” and “non-Western,” are part of a broader circulation of intellec-
tual traditions, which travel from West to non-West, and from non-West 
to the West. Each time these ideas are reconstituted, they take on new 
meanings. It is important to critically engage them, to grasp the com-
12 Steven Wasserstrom, Religion after Religion: Gershom Scholem, Mircea Eliade, and Henry 
Corbin at Eranos (Princeton University Press, 1999).
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plexity of their place and origin. This applies equally to orientalism and 
Islam. It is, therefore, necessary to trace the multi-directional migrations 
as a transnational space of exchange.
Fardid is often represented as a case study of Iranian and Islamic intel-
lectual militancy, an anti-orientalist and anti-Western hero of the authen-
tic. This is certainly how Fardid portrayed himself, and his many faithful 
associates have extended this one-dimensional myth. Upon critical exa-
mination, Fardid’s ideas are more derivative of Bergson and Corbin in his 
early phase, and Heidegger in later years. This is not to suggest that Far-
did was merely a passive receptacle for these “foreign” ideas. Rather, I am 
suggesting that a serious exchange of ideas occurred, and it is important 
to locate its re-forged boundaries through intellectual exchange patterns.
What is clear, however, is that Fardid’s thought is not purely local or 
non-Western. This is also the case with the Iranian liberal or leftist in-
tellectuals. They are all embedded in a complex circulation of intellectual 
traditions and ideas, which rather demolishes the entrenched post-colonial 
myth of a local and authentic culture opposing imported “cultural valu-
es.” This is simply a falsehood, and yet the cliché thrives in contemporary 
academia in deeply harmful manner.
We require studies of intellectual migrations from the center to peri-
phery, and back and forth. In the case of Fardid, his notion of Gharbzadegi 
was conceived in Heidelberg, Germany, rather than Tehran, Iran. Ghar-
bzadegi travelled to Iran, and we now consider it as an Iranian intellectual 
production (as Dipankar Gupta’s book on Indian modernity argues).13 
The major elements of Gharbzadegi – anti-modernism and the return to 
Iranian/Islamic tradition – were articulated in Europe. The template was 
largely conceived in Germany’s cultural struggle against “Enlightened” 
Western Europe, and partly within Europe’s own counter-modern fringe. 
Corbin’s notion of Shi’ism, as Iranian or Spiritual Islam, and Heidegger’s 
confrontation with Western rational and secular thought, were both Eu-
ropean intellectual productions. It is, of course, important to consider the 
anti-Western and “spiritual” ideas in the Iranian intellectual traditions as 
well. However, it is mistaken to hold – as is routinely assumed – that the 
idea of Gharbzadegi is rooted in Iranian or a non-Western cultural space. In 
fact, Fardid was annoyed by Al-e Ahmad’s use of Gharbzadegi precisely be-
cause he felt that it failed to appreciate the Heideggerian critique of Western 
metaphysics. Al-e Ahmad saw an ideological opportunity to mobilize the 
Iranian masses along nativist lines. For Fardid, however, the core issue was 
13  Dipankar Gupta, Mistaken Modernity: India Between Worlds (New Delhi: Harper Collins 2001).
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a theoretical genealogy extending to ancient Greek rationalism. In Fardid’s 
mind, this implied the prospect of a total revolution in human conscious-
ness, a remarkable spiritual rebirth.
We need to reflect deeply upon the theoretical implications of Fardid 
and Corbin, for they have far-reaching significance concerning the ortho-
dox boundaries of contemporary scholarship. These ideas are interrelated 
in the following manner:
1. It is a false assumption to hold that the Western discourse 
on the East (in this case, Islam) is a modernist view, imposed 
mostly from the outside, and frames our knowledge of the East. 
Corbin was certainly an orientalist and a French gentleman. 
However, he was also keenly interested in specific traditions 
within Islam, which he spent most of his life researching and 
writing about. He was particularly influenced by Suhrawardy’s 
thought. Ironically, several generations of influential Iranian 
intellectuals – including Fardid, Nasr, Shayegan, and Shari’ati 
– all embraced anti-modernism, and were critical of Western 
views of the East, yet were deeply influenced by Corbin’s idio-
syncratic analysis of Islam. They accordingly produced a view 
of Islam which took intellectual root in Iran. It is now prized 
as an authentic and local Iranian intellectual contribution. 
This version of Iranian Islam is now imagined as either an en-
tirely Western construction, or a purely Iranian version of Is-
lam. The understanding of Islam, in both cases, is limited and 
analytically problematic.
2. It is problematic that scholars such as Fardid, Nasr, Shayegan, 
or even Shari’ati, are considered authentically Iranian, while 
secular intellectuals such as Ahmad Shamlu or Taghi Arani are 
labeled as westernized. Why is it that European thinkers such as 
Bergson, Corbin, Heidegger, and Foucault are considered spe-
cial cases, and no other Western philosophers – such as Locke, 
Smith, Kant, Marx, and Dewey – enjoy this privilege? There is 
an orthodox post-colonial optic underlying this routine differ-
entiation, and a false and harmful one.
3. Let us consider Fardid’s case more specifically. He studied in 
Europe for eight years, and, even before, he mostly translated 
the works of European and American scholars.14 At Tehran 
14 Fardid’s earlier works were almost all on European philosophy, Bergson, Kant, Heidegger 
or the American educational system, including a piece on John Dewey.
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University Fardid only offered classes in European philosophy. 
He hardly ever wrote or lectured on what is considered tradi-
tional Islam (the exceptions are when he presented his ideas in 
the West).15 Fardid was certainly not a practicing Muslim. What 
gives him more Iranian authenticity, compared to liberal or 
even Left-leaning Iranian intellectuals, say, a person like Nima 
Yushij? Fardid was not shy in reminding us that he was interest-
ed above all in a Heideggerian (phenomenology, hermeneutics) 
interpretation of Islam. What makes the Heideggerian Islam 
more authentic or local than say, liberal Islam, or a Kantian un-
derstanding of Islam? Is this a political position, or a statement 
about the production of knowledge? And, if political, what poli-
tics precisely?
4. Regardless of our theoretical preferences, we must conclude 
that hegemonic/subjugated knowledge is more complex than 
the works of Said or Foucault have influentially articulated. This 
critical issue requires greater elaboration: why do we assume, 
in the context of Iran or other Islamic societies, that liberal-
ism and modernism are the dominant and hegemonic mode of 
understanding the world? Or that, the political order of things 
is institutionalized within the liberal political and intellectual 
framework? Is this really the case in all corners of the world? 
This is either a great simplification, or it is an anti-modernist 
way of thinking about our time.
To conclude, I would like to suggest that, our understanding of orienta-
lism, in the Islamic context, requires a more complex conceptualiza-
tion. Said’s evocation of a modernist and Western desire to represent 
the East as an object of domination, as the core of the orientalist schol-
arship, is at best, incomplete, and, at worst, naive. Corbin was militant-
ly anti-modernist and anti-Western. In many respects, his ideas were 
perhaps closer to that of post-colonial theorists. Yet, he was also an ori-
entalist. This conundrum requires careful thinking and critical reflection. 
15 The title of Fardid’s thesis was “Le problème de l’inexistence netiquette dans la philo-
sophie de l’Islam.” Fardid attended, in May 1968, the Congress of Orientalists, in Ann 




Many Faces of Gharbzadegi: Fardid, Al-e Ahmad and Shari’ati
From the preceding analysis, we may draw a series of preliminary conclu-
sions. At a broad level, the academically popular anti-modern critique of 
modernity encompasses a wider intellectual and social movement than 
exemplified in Heidegger and the German tradition affiliated with him. 
However, there is a deep elective affinity with comparable intellectual 
movements, and their political logic. In Iran, an important strain in anti-
Western ideas precedes Fardid, and has been articulated by other Iranian 
thinkers including Kasravi, Shadman, and others. These two postulates 
provide a focus for better explaining the ideological and political logic of 
the worldwide Islamist movement, as a mode of popular rebellion and an 
academic posture of ultra-radicalism.
This essay explains Islamism, a modern ideological movement, within 
the broader context of the nativist social imaginary of Gharbzadegi – as a 
paradoxically universal phenomenon. Weber’s “elective affinities” very ef-
fectively explains its internal conflicts and contradictions, why it can ap-
peal simultaneously to state elites, capitalists, proletarian revolutionaries, 
and bohemian artists, and serve conflicting social interests while retai-
ning discursive coherence. It also explains other forms of Gharbzadegi, 
and how they either share features or differ from Islamism. 
To make sense of Gharbzadegi, in this respect, we need a correspon-
ding explanation for modernity. In this light, the history of neither mo-
dernization nor liberal democracy ever developed “naturally,” or in a 
“normal” social situation over time (as Habermas has argued concerning 
France and England). In every case, society was forced, and, even as they 
modernized, they also developed a hostile and painful relationship with 
modernity. Even after becoming modern, or modernizing, an intense and 
even violent struggle continued, and proceeded to shape the moderni-
zation process in a more “rational”, or, as post-colonial theorists call it, 
“local,” way. It is within this conjuncture that the ‘old regime,’ masses, 
and intellectuals may share similar social and political attitudes, that we 
may characterize as an “elective affinity.” This is the case being made for 
Gharbzadegi as a social imaginary. It is the general sociological source of 
anti-modern ideologies and social movements. Both the left and conser-
vative, religious and secular, partake of a common social imaginary, while 
believing they confront each other from irreconcilably opposed ideolo-
gical divides. The ideology is not the primary mover, but complex and 
17
many-sided institutional pressures, mediated through a traceable social 
imaginary, where worldview and social interest have “elective affinities.”
It is Gharbzadegi as a social imaginary that animates diverse and 
conflicting social interests. There is only an “elective affinity” between 
different groups. The masses starve but do not speak (i.e. they have no 
channel). The intellectuals may be unemployed and hungry, but they are 
literate, privileged, and partake of a cosmopolitan intellectual culture. 
Military intellectuals are concerned with performance in war, and the 
treatment of the masses (because now they come from the masses, unlike 
before). From these differing vantage points, they recognize themselves.
Discussion of Gharbzadegi in post-revolutionary Iran has produced 
many scholarly, thoughtful, and realistic pieces on the anti-modern dis-
course in Iran in the 1960s and 70s. There are also studies that focus on some 
of the leading intellectuals who coined, popularized, and polarized, the con-
cept of Gharbzadegi in pre-and post-revolutionary Iran. Ahmad Fardid, Jalal 
Al-e Ahmad, and Ali Shari’ati are considered the intellectual bearers of the 
anti-modern and anti-Western discourse in Iran. Some have also presented 
earlier anti-Western ideas in the work of Ahmad Kasravi, Shademan, and 
others.
Overall, the explanation for the rise and popularity of Gharbzadegi in 
Iran is attributed to either religion and/or tradition (i.e. Islamic reaction 
to modern ideas, secularism, democracy, etc.), or leftist and Third Word-
list anti-imperialist currents, and Iranian nativism. These are primari-
ly based on the assumption that intellectuals or movements propagated 
Gharbzadegi discourse to undermine the modernizing and pro-Western 
Pahlavi State. What if, however, the actual roots of Gharbzadegi discourse 
are embedded in the very Pahlavi state ideology? That certainly undermi-
nes several generations of consensus on Gharbzadegi as uniquely opposi-
tional, or even authentically indigenous.
In an article entitled “Ghost of Heidegger,” Alexander S. Duff provides 
the context for the Iranian anti-modern discourse, within the global set-
ting of social and material elements interacting as “elective affinities” with 
the Gharbzadegi social imaginary:
A specter haunts the post-Cold War liberal order – the specter 
of radical spiritual malaise. This discontent with or down-
right opposition to the Western-originated, universalist 
claims of the broadly liberal cultural, economic, and po-
litical order takes diverse forms. One can detect it among  
Iranian revolutionary theocrats, Russian imperialist 
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ideologues, white supremacist “Identities,” European neo-
fascists, identity-politics partisans, and anti-foundationalism  
intellectuals of many stripes. But standing behind some of 
the leading intellectual and political figures in this mélange 
of counter-liberalism is one animating mind, that of Martin 
Heidegger.16
This suggests that a broader sociological and material basis exists for anti-
modern ideas. The article evokes a “radical spiritual malaise.” By this loo-
se grounding for analysis, the article asks why other alternative ideologies 
have failed, but the Heideggerian social imaginary is still pervasive? Since 
the end of the Cold War, an open question has persisted over whether any 
organizing political principle can successfully compete with the liberal 
consensus on the secular state, constrained by democratic accountability 
and rule of law. To date, neither the remnants of Soviet-style communism, 
nor authoritarian capitalism, reactionary fascism, or Islamic theocracy 
have achieved a successful combination of military strength and political 
legitimacy even among their own citizens. But the Heideggerian legacy 
threatens liberal democracy, because of the breadth of its appeal abroad 
and at home.
Heidegger’s vision exemplifies the struggle between liberal cosmopo-
litanism and local cultural or moral claims to identity. It recommends 
itself to virtually every variety of particularism, while charging universa-
list claims with being too thin to provide meaningful sources of human 
identity. Here is a good explanation for why Heidegger’s critique of the 
modern West is attractive to anti-modern intellectuals and movements, 
and what is wrong with liberalism.
The Heideggerian template can help to clear up the confusion about 
the origin and the construction of Gharbzadegi discourse. It helps to 
explain how, based on “elective affinities,” radical, conservative, secular, 
and religious intellectuals and political figures have all embraced it from 
varied perspectives. It both corresponded to their perceived interests and 
seemed aesthetically compelling. This explains how Gharbzadegi became 
a vision of political radicalization, for revolutionaries seeking a new revo-
lutionary ideology faced with political setback. For example, many Irani-
an intellectuals, known as the third line, Khate Secom, who mostly left the 
Tudeh party to join a new intellectual circle of liberal Islamists (Nehzate 
Azadi), were instrumental in using and popularizing Gharbzadegi in the 
16 Alexander S. Duff, “Heidegger’s Ghosts,” The American Interest 11, no. 5 (February 25, 
2016).
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1960s and 70s. Both Al-e Ahmad and Shari’ati belong to these currents, 
and they are mostly responsible for the radical propagation of Gharbza-
degi. Others in this current were keen to use Gharbzadegi to delegitimize 
the secular left, or the modernization of the Iranian society. These indi-
viduals, however, made an abrupt turn. After the revolution, and without 
any self-critique, they became champions of anti-Gharbzadegi ideology.
It is necessary to clarify the origin and distinctiveness of various usa-
ges and meanings for the term Gharbzadegi. Fardid, Al-e Ahmad, and 
Shari’ati shared several important ideas:
1. that “religion,” in the Iranian context, involves the tradition of 
thinking and doing in the local and customary way. Sacred mo-
rality, they held, at the center of life, has declined and is being 
eradicated. They all three realized this and had no illusion about 
the viability of returning to or maintaining it.
2. Their project was, in a way, a post-Islamic recovery of tradition. 
To this extent, they relied on a similar intellectual idea in the 
West, with a similar concern for the twilight of traditional social 
meaning and organization.
3. They were also either indifferent, or even hostile, to religious 
scholars who they perceived as “fighting a losing battle,” or, un-
prepared to participate in their new project of a “futurist” tra-
ditionalism.
To the extent that these three thinkers are displeased with the decline of 
religion and tradition, they were, each in their own ways, hostile to mo-
dernity and sympathetic to anti-modernism. Yet the three also had sub- 
stantial differences of outlook. Fardid was less interested in articulating a 
project for the future, and yearned to defeat the modern world, based on a 
dark view of the future. His project was apocalyptic. Fardid’s attraction to 
Nazism, his enthusiasm for Khomeini’s leadership, and proximity to the 
state security forces, are the evidence for this.17
As an intellectual, Fardid was a deeply obscure figure. He wrote in in-
accessible jargon. It is possible that without Al-e Ahmad’s popularization 
of the term Gharbzadegi, Fardid would never have been elevated in Iran’s 
political and intellectual history. Fardid’s concept borrowed the Heide-
ggerian notion that something intrinsic to Greek rationality had blocked 
a spiritual core in human experience and promoted an objectifying ten-
dency. By this account, the modern sickness had contaminated the West 
and Iran long ago. Certainly, in the Abbasid Empire, Islam was already 
17 Mirsepassi, Transnationalism in Iranian Political Thought.
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contaminated by Gharbzadegi, and the “ontological roots” in the Prophe-
tic era were cut away. Hence, like Heidegger, Fardid condemned what he 
called “humanism,” or the priority of the human subject and agency, in 
favor of a transcendental mode of intervention. None of this far-fetched, 
almost cultish, science fiction-like cosmic melodrama would have occur-
red to the more down to earth Al-e Ahmad.
Al-e Ahmad, by contrast, was an Iranian nationalist, a public intel-
lectual, disillusioned by the Mashruteh project and Tudeh Party failures. 
He sought a native or national project for his country. From having consi-
dered the Soviet Union the “world’s most progressive nation,” he became 
bitterly disillusioned.18 He was open to borrowing from the West, and, 
strikingly, considered the Israeli experience as a possible model for Iran. 
Al-e Ahmad kept a diary while visiting Israel in 1962, writing:
I as an Easterner [prefer] an Israeli model over all other models 
of how to deal with the West. How to extract from its industries 
by the spiritual power of mass martyrdom, how to take restitu-
tion from it and spend the capital thus obtained to advance the 
country.19
This ‘spiritual vision,’ hinting at future Islamist imaginaries, reveals how 
Al-e Ahmad saw Israel as “the basis for a power,” an alternative model 
to either Soviet socialism or Western capitalism.20 Israel had mobilized 
religious culture to produce economic prosperity, political independence, 
and cultural belonging for the national population. In discussions of the 
roots of Islamism, this Israeli inspiration – amidst narrow Cold War op-
tions – is frequently overlooked. Many scholars like to trace Islamist ideo-
logy to roots in the Qur’an or the time of the Prophet, but this was hardly 
relevant to the thinking of seminal Islamist pioneer, sometimes Marxist, 
and literary modernist Al-e Ahmad.
Al-e Ahmad’s notion of Gharbzadegi was a radical and populist one, 
set upon quite material and pragmatic aims. In this sense, Fardid was cor-
rect to repeatedly remind us that Al-e Ahmad had never fully understood 
the idea of Gharbzadegi as a philosophical critique and rejection of the 
Western worldview. Ale Ahmad turned the notion of Gharbzadegi into 
18 Jalal Al-e Ahmad, "Introduction," in André Gide, Return from Soviet Union (Teheran, 
Akhtar Shoma Publisher, 1954), 4.
19 Jalal Al-e Ahmad, A Travel to Israel (Tehran: Nashr-e Araye-Negah, 1978), 50.
20 Ibid.
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a less substantial, but ultimately more inclusive and pragmatic, idea: a 
conceptual optic to analyze and critique “dependent” modernity in Iran.
Al-e Ahmad’s effort was sparked by disillusionment with the socialist 
Tudeh Party’s capitulation to Soviet demands. Al-e Ahmad articulated a 
sharp critique of Western hegemonic power centered around the concept 
of “Westoxification” (Gharbzadegi). This critique attacks Iranian secular 
intellectuals as complicit in Western power, and incapable of effectively 
constructing modernity in Iran. Al-e Ahmad argued that a “return” to an 
“authentic” Islamic culture was necessary if Iran was to avoid the homo-
genizing and alienating forces of socio-technological modernization. Yet, 
the “return” advocated by Ale-Ahmad is not a simple one. His populist 
Islam would not reject modernization as such, but re-imagine modernity 
in accordance with Islamic principles, symbolism, and identities.
Al-e Ahmad undertook ethnographic researches into the Iranian 
peasantry, inspiring his charge that the “onslaught of machine and ma-
chine civilization” would “sweep away” Iran’s entire “local and cultural 
identity.” This was a primarily sociological political criticism: “Why? 
So that a factory can operate in the West, or that workers in Iceland or 
Newfoundland are not jobless.”21 Yet an epistemic-ontological inversion 
followed this initially sociological analysis, resulting in Al-e Ahmad’s 
relegation of objective or universal knowledge to a secondary status be-
hind cultural identity. He did not want his ethnographic monographs to 
become “a commodity for European consumption” based on “European 
criteria.” Instead, Al-e Ahmad aimed to produce a “renewal of [Iranian] 
self-awareness” based on “our own criteria.”22 By this, Al-e Ahmad meant 
that he hoped to mobilize the Iranian masses using culturally familiar 
symbols. This is still a secular orientation. Al-e Ahmad took the step into 
Heideggerian thought when he started to conceive the Iranian predica-
ment in terms of “a disease,” an “accident from without,” “spreading in 
an environment rendered susceptible to it.”23 He thereby depicted Pahlavi 
modernization as culturally alien, and implied that an authentically Shi’a 
Iranian path must exist. Yet this had less to do with traditional Shi’ism, 
and a closer affinity of European Romantic critiques of modern scien-
tific knowledge in favor of instinctive peasant proximity to the earth: 
21 Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent: The ideological foundation of the Islamic Revolu-
tion in Iran (New York: New York University Press. 1993), 59.
22 Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Iranian Society. An Anthology of Writings (Lexington: Mazda Publish-
ers, 1982), 17.
23 Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Occidentosis: A Plague from the West (Penang: Citizens International, 
2004), 27.
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“the peasant’s horse will have bolted to the safety of open land before the 
seismograph has recorded [the earthquake].”24 Upon the same basis, Al-e 
Ahmad rejected shallow ideologies (“all of these ‘isms’” leading to “me-
chanization”) in favor of ontology – Iran’s “historico-cultural character”, 
in the direct inspiration of “beauty and poetry.”25 
Ali Shari’ati continued and extended Al-e Ahmad’s critique by ar-
ticulating a positive theory of Islamic ideology as a modernizing force. 
Shari’ati, as a young man was a nationalist, affiliated with the National 
Front. Later he became more radically politicized as a student in Paris, 
drawn deeply into the Third Worldist movement, the politics of the Al-
gerian FLN, French existentialism, and Franz Fanon. From these expe-
riences, Shari’ati became convinced of the need for a single ideological 
basis if Iranian national liberation was to succeed. He drew liberally from 
Marxism to construct a populist and activist Islam. Rather than a binary 
between East/West, he aspired to a dialogue between the two to articu-
late a viable modernity. Shari’ati, in Red Shi’ism, argued that the best of 
Iranian Islamic tradition and modern Western radical ideology might be 
combined in a solution to the modern world’s problems.26 He observed 
the trials of Western capitalism and Soviet socialism, seeing both riven 
with failings. Shari’ati was interested in Iranian identity politics, but less 
upon an anti-Western than an anti-capitalist basis.
Through these readings, the discourse of authenticity emerges as a di-
alogic mode of reconciling local cultures with modernity, rather than a 
stubborn determination to avoid modernity at all costs. Their calls for a 
revitalized and politicized Islam represent attempts to negotiate with the 
universalizing tendencies of modernity, rather than the gathering storm 
clouds of a clash of civilizations.
Shari’ati was more complicated, and perhaps intellectually more naïve, 
than either Fardid or Al-e Ahmad. In an ironic way, he was both more se-
cular, and more religious, than the other two. He was more influenced by 
Marxism and radical revolutionary ideas, especially secular Third World 
discourses of the 1960s. Simultaneously, Shari’ati was far more concerned 
with offering a positive, or alternative, interpretation of Islam: as anti-
capitalist, anti-liberal, and very revolutionary. It is harder to make a case 
24 Al-e Ahmad, Occidentosis, 27–28.
25 Al-e Ahmad, Occidentosis, 136.
26 Ervand Abrahamian, Radical Islam: Iranian Mojahedin (United Kingdom: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1992), 116.
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that Shari’ati was genuinely a consistent antimodernist. However, Corbin 
and Heidegger were his important influences.
One can suggest that the Shari’ati approach to Islam can potentially 
lead to a liberal Islamic discourse. It is a kind of liberalism that is less se-
cular and more communitarian and sensitive to social justice. Some may 
take this as unrealistic for two reasons: Shari’ati was influenced by Cor-
bin and Heideggerian notions of authenticity, and, particularly, Marxism. 
“Religious liberalism” contains an inherent tension. While liberalism 
embedded in religion might seem an attractive idea, it shatters upon the 
rocks of rival authenticity claims upon being institutionalized.
Addressing the youth and the middle class, Shari’ati reconstructed 
Shi’a Islam to entail a religious obligation to revolt against regimes based 
on injustice, i.e. all existing state power worldwide. The only successful 
revolution, moreover, must spring from authentic religious roots, and not 
alien Western ideologies. The “backwards looking” Iranian Shi’a clergy 
were useless for this purpose. Only a dynamic modern intellectual vangu-
ard could assume leadership. Shari’ati envisioned the “modern calamities” 
in terms of the universal human rootlessness inflicted by the machine: 
“Humanity is every day more condemned to alienation, more drowned in 
this mad maelstrom of compulsive speed.” He implied that the qualitative, 
poetic side of human life had been lost: “Not only is there no longer leisure 
for growth in human values, moral greatness, and spiritual aptitudes,” but 
“traditional moral values decline and disappear as well.”27
Shari’ati, however, transcends this essentially romantic view to con-
struct Shi’a Islam as a revolutionary organizational machine, based on 
“the war of religion against religion”, i.e. a revived authentic revolutio-
nary Islam versus the existing but inauthentic conservative orthodoxy. 
Shari’ati used these ideas in explicitly Heideggerian manner, as rival 
tendencies perennially undergoing battle within the Shi’a tradition, but 
with only one ontologically legitimated idea. He maintained that “true 
Islam,” the “revolutionary sort,” has been “forgotten.” Rejecting the su-
perficiality of “one-dimensional facts,” Shari’ati based his red Shi’ism on 
a politics of the “self.”28 The Heideggerian element in Shari’ati is fused 
with revolutionary Marxism. The true enemy was the “petty bourgeoi-
sie,” the “dirty connection” which had spoiled true Islam.29 The real 
aim of Islam, Shari’ati held, was the Marxist aim of building a “class-
27 Ali Shari’ati, Marxism and other Western fallacies: An Islamic critique (Berkeley: Mizan 
Press, 1980), 32.
28 Abrahamian, Radical Islam, 116.
29 Dabashi, Theology of Discontent, 122, 141–42.
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less society” on earth, to be governed by the modern intelligentsia.30 
The author of “Heidegger’s Ghosts” therefore makes a good point, in ar-
guing that Heidegger’s ideas in Iran, in the anti-modern Gharbzadegi dis-
course, concerned a “futuristic” project:
Several leading Iranian thinkers prior to and following the 
1979 Revolution were formed by their understanding of 
Heidegger, drawing on his thought in both the diagnosis of 
the toxicity of Western civilization and their aspiration for 
a future oriented, permanent revolution that would retrieve 
something of an Islamic past lost beneath the stomping boots 
of history.31
The author of “Heidegger’s Ghosts” only makes certain factual errors. 
It was not Shari’ati, but Ahmad Fardid, who introduced Heidegger and 
his philosophy into Iran, and, in the 1930s rather than the1950s. Also, 
Shari’ati, while in Paris, collaborated with Frantz Fanon, and was influ-
enced by Jean-Paul Sartre. Shari’ati was also influenced by another Pa-
risian scholar, Henri Corbin, and his idea of Shi’ism as the core Persian 
spiritual tradition. Henri Corbin was the first person who introduced Hei-
degger to France, and first translated the works of Heidegger into French.
We see, in this tangle of examples, a circulatory dynamic. The same 
type of explanation applies to Corbin. He was a product of the crisis of 
the Third Republic, and the Franco-Prussian War, where the Catholic 
Royalist movement finally yielded to the secular republican movement 
– who embraced the Rights of Man, while practicing colonialism. Corbin 
went to the Middle East, looking for his lost utopia for France. Corbin 
hated France because it had betrayed the Catholic monarchist tradition, 
to install a secular republic. The Turkish and Iranian intellectuals Corbin 
encountered were hostile to France because of its imperialist designs on 
their national sovereignty. Corbin and these intellectuals found common 
ground, in being hostile to France. Yet their reasons were entirely diffe-
rent. Despite this difference, together, they helped to spread the Gharbza-
degi social imaginary, and expand its popularity. To hear Corbin’s criti-
cism of the West, rooted in a deeper tradition, from de Maistre, but above 
all WW I and Heidegger, was a blessed occasion for many. Not so for the 
left or liberal streams in the Middle East, but they faced their own tragedy. 
30 Abrahamian, Radical Islam, 113–14.
31 Duff, “Heidegger’s Ghosts.”
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The new USSR practiced ruthless geopolitics, and the charge of collabora-
tion with Western power hung over those embracing Western ideologies.
To add to the complexity of this picture, Foucault followed the trail of 
Corbin. This was another French intellectual with very different concerns. 
A student of Louis Althusser, who had yet grown disillusioned with the 
“vulgarity” of French Marxism, he hated the secular republic in France. 
This hostility was not from a religious view, but a disillusioned Left one. 
The revulsion with “secular humanism” inspired Foucault to seek a “way 
out” of modernity through revolutionary Shi’a Islam. He associated “se-
cular humanism” with the “disciplinary society” which had destroyed the 
soul, which had thrived in the relative anarchy of premodern societies 
(the mad as visionaries, public torture of heroic criminals, unrestrained 
bucolic sexual pleasures in the villages, etc.). Foucault, visiting Iran du-
ring the revolution, wrote articles extolling “spiritual Islam,” and “mythi-
cal” or “spiritual” politics, as exciting new political possibilities beyond 
Western liberal norms. These views derived less from Foucault’s Marxist 
teacher, Althusser, and, rather, from readings of Louis Massignon and 
Henri Corbin. Foucault derived from these sources a premonition that so-
mething new, unprecedented, and perhaps mystical was emerging in the 
Iranian revolution. Celebrating the revolution’s “mythical leaders,” Fou-
cault went as far as to castigate Iranian secular and non-religious forces, 
charging them with reproducing a dull Western model (i.e. constitutio-
nal, reformist), rather than entering the new and exciting terrain of spi-
ritual politics. Foucault saw in the Iranian Revolution an instantiation of 
his quasi-mystical thesis on the “death of man,” i.e. the epistemic reign of 
the human sciences. In short, he adopted a Heideggerian optic of ontology 
triumphing over epistemology. Foucault rejoiced at the Iranian Revoluti-
on as the escape from an “imposed teleology” – a mystic and irrational 
outlook, reflecting personal intellectual obsessions more than social rea-
lity.32 It portended, he excitedly urged, “a different way of thinking about 
social and political organization, one that takes nothing from Western 
philosophy.”33 The Enlightenment, he maintained, with “objectivity” and 
“rationality,” was the “revolutionary enemy.”34
Foucault ridiculed Marxism and the Left, declared his hatred for capi-
talism and democracy (as “modernity”), and ultimately embraced a very 
32 Michel Foucault, The Essential Foucault: Selections from the Essential Works of Foucault, 
1954–1984, ed. Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose, Revised edition (New York: The New 
Press, 2003), 332.
33 Janet Afary and Kevin Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the 
Seductions of Islamism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 186.
34 Afary and Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, 185.
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similar anti-modernist ideology to Corbin. Foucault, a Bataille and Nietz-
schean inspired scholar, had an undertow of religious obsessions. There 
was also a certain elitism – a preoccupation with the beauty of private 
rituals and experiences, sheltered from the banality of modern mass so-
ciety. These elements fostered in Foucault, a comparatively privileged and 
celebrated intellectual, an indulgence for Gharbzadegi – the attraction to 
the arcane, the sacred, a fusion of individual and higher abstract princip-
les like divine oneness, and, above all, a rupture with the money nexus of 
modernity.
The masses in Iran, and other semi-colonized countries, faced a dif-
ferent reality. They could hardly have been attracted to Gharbzadegi for 
the same reasons as Foucault. Yet they did become attracted to it, from 
an entirely different horizon of experience. Their social interests were 
not Foucault’s. But the “elective affinity” existed between Foucault and 
the Iranian masses. Nothing indigenous compelled the Iranian masses 
to embrace Gharbzadegi. Iran’s modern history shows another direction. 
There was genuine multi-class mass enthusiasm for rule of law and natio-
nal autonomy in the Constitutional Revolution, starting with the tobacco 
revolt, and culminating in a Constitutional Monarchy. Then, there was 
World War I, imposing horrible conditions, and, the 1921 British sponso-
red coup that set up a dictator, to protect British India from Russia. Even 
so, in the National Front interim, there was still mass Iranian support for 
a “Liberal” and “Marxist” politics. After the U.S. sponsored 1953 coup 
against the popularly elected Mossadegh, the second such coup in a cen-
tury, the real disillusionment with the West viscerally set in.
27
References
Abrahamian, Ervand. Radical Islam: Iranian 
Mojahedin. United Kingdom: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1992.
Afary, Janet, Kevin Anderson. Foucault and 
the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the 
Seductions of Islamism. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2005.
Al-e Ahmad, Jalal. Occidentosis: A Plague 
from the West. Penang: Citizens Interna-
tional, 2004.
Al-e Ahmad, Jalal. Iranian Society. An An-
thology of Writings. Lexington: Mazda 
Publishers, 1982.
Al-e Ahmad, Jalal. A Travel to Israel [Safar 
be Vellayate Ezrail] (Tehran: Nashr-e 
Araye-Negah, 1978). 
Al-e Ahmad, Jalal. “Introduction.” In André 
Gide. Return from Soviet Union. Tehran: 
Akhtar Shoma Publisher, 1954.
Dabashi, Hamid. Theology of discontent: 
The ideological foundation of the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran. New York: New York 
University Press, 1993.
de Gandillac, Maurice. Genèses de la moder-
nité: Les douze siècles où se fit notre Eu-
rope; de “La cité de Dieu” à “La nouvelle 
Atlantide.” Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1992.
Dewey, John. A Common Faith. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1991.
Duff, Alexander S. “Heidegger’s Ghosts.” The 
American Interest 11, no. 5 (February 25, 
2016). https://www.the-american-inter-
est.com/2016/02/25/heideggers-ghosts/
Fardid, Ahmad. Gharb va Gharbzadegi. Vol. 
1. unpublished. Tehran: Iran Research 
Institute for Philosophy.
Foucault, Michel. The Essential Foucault: Se-
lections from the Essential Works of Fou-
cault, 1954-1984. Edited by Paul Rabi-
now and Nikolas Rose, Revised edition, 
New York: The New Press, 2003.
Ghamari-Tabrizi, Behrooz. Foucault in Iran: 
Islamic Revolution after the Enlighten-
ment. Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 2016.
Ghamari-Tabrizi, Behrooz. “When Life Will 
No Longer Barter Itself: In Defense of 
Foucault on the Iranian Revolution.” In 
A Foucault for the 21st Century: Govern-
mentality, Biopolitics and Discipline in 
the New Millennium, edited by Sam Bin-
kley and Jorge Capetillo, 272–92. Newcas-
tle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009.
Gupta, Dipankar. Mistaken modernity: India 
between worlds. New Delhi: HarperCol-
lins, 2001.
Herf, Jeffrey. Reactionary modernism. Lon-
don: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Mirsepassi, Ali. Transnationalism in Iranian 
Political Thought: The Life and Times of 
Ahmad Fardid. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017.
Rodinson, Maxime. “Khomeini and the ‘Pri-
macy of the Spiritual.’ ” Le Nouvel Obser-
vateur, February 19, 1979.
Shari’ati, Ali. Marxism and other Western 
fallacies: An Islamic critique. Berkeley: 
Mizan Press, 1980.
Wasserstrom, Steven M. Religion after Reli-
gion: Gershom Scholem, Mircea Eliade, 
and Henry Corbin at Eranos. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999.
28
